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Introduction
Globalization has been recognized as the principal force currently dominating the economic universe. It upholds to illuminate the world with economic prosperity and seeks a victory of markets over governments and self-interest over altruism. Even more imperative is the global commitment to continuing and accelerating the pace of human development which signifies the culmination of the historical processes of cultural progress. The dilemma however is that, while globalization is a lusty ineluctable historical process whose march can be halted only by endangering the prosperity of peoples and nations, it also threatens to disfigure human development in the manner it is evolving. Accordingly, as a dynamic force for change throughout the world, it is expected to cause unprecedented surges in the wealth of nation by extending the world's production possibility frontier outward and redefining the world as a "Global Village" (Asongu, 2013a) . Conversely, it is also reviled as a process destined to cause social and economic disintegration as well as ecological decay. It is also feared to be accelerating the race to the bottom by grabbing from the poor and giving to the rich, marginalizing nations already integrated in the world economy and decoupling them from scientific advancements performed in the developed world. The phenomenon is deepening pre-existing hollows in the levels of economic wellbeing within and between nations to a threshold where they have become socially, morally and economically unacceptable. These have mushroomed increase fears that developed countries may increasingly use globalization to enact disguised colonialism. Hence, not surprisingly the public support for globalization has waned in both developed and developing countries with a frantic search for a third dimension out of the morally enervating regime of unvarnished capitalism.
The current wave of politico-economic globalization began in the 1980s with growing cross border financial flows among industrial countries as well as among developing economies. This was facilitated by the liberalization of capital controls in many of these economies since it was widely anticipated that improved cross-border flows would bring higher gains in terms of better capital allocation and improved possibilities of international risk-sharing. Some scholars and policy makers have been of the view that, these benefits ought to be high for developing countries that have more volatile income growth and tend to be relatively capital-poor (Kose et al., 2006) . Accordingly, with the surge in financial inflows came a spade of currency and financial turmoils in the late 1980s and 1990s. This pattern set the course for many policy makers to begin advocating that developing countries which opened-up their capital accounts have been more vulnerable to crises (and consequently more adversely affected) than their industrial counterparts (Kose et al., 2011; Henry, 2007; Asongu, 2013b,c) . These developments have ignited a fierce and heated debate among academics and practitioners of globalization policies. While the debate over the positive gains from trade liberalization has moved towards a consensus (Kose et al., 2006) , that on other globalization policies (especially capital account openness) has intensified and become more polarized (Asongu, 2013b,c) .
In the 1980s and 1990s, most African countries embarked on a chain of globalization oriented measures (structural and policy adjustments at financial, economic and political levels) with the goal of given impetus to economic growth as well as improving overall economic and human development (Janine & Elbadawi, 1992; Asongu, 2013c) . In the first generation of reforms, adopted policies revolved around: reducing direct government intervention in bank credit decisions, abolishing explicit control on the pricing and allocation of credit, relaxing of control on international capital movements and, allowing of interests rates to be market determined. Second generation reforms targeted institutional and structural constraints, notably: improvement of the legal, regulatory, supervisory and institutional environments, restoring of bank soundness and, rehabilitation of financial infrastructure . Unfortunately, despite over two decades of globalization reforms, poverty and inequality in Africa have remained stubbornly high (Asongu, 2013d) . As far as we have reviewed, while a substantial bulk of the literature has examined the impact of global reforms on financial development and growth (Cho, 1986; Arestis et al., 2002; , the current bulk of studies that have investigated the pro-poor globalization channels in Africa have either been theoretical or limited to appraising first generation reforms for the most part (Nissanke & Thorbecke, 2005 , 2008 Sindzingre, 2005) .
With increasing universal demand to recapture some of its attractive glow and lofty ambitions, that the superior claims of globalization be given a "human face" by saddling the increasingly ungovernable world of trade and finance with a global civic ethic, the present study aims to investigate two main issues arising: (1) whether institutions are instrumental in the effect of globalization on the human face and; (2) assessing the freedom channels of globalization that matter for the instrumentality of formal institutions in poverty and inequality reduction. By employing a plethora of globalization policies (financial, trade, institutional, political ...etc.), we present a broad and exhaustive picture of the nexuses between globalization and poverty. Moreover, the use of much recent data provides findings with more focused and updated policy implications. The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Data and methodology are discussed and outlined respectively in Section 2. Section 3 is devoted to empirical analysis. We conclude with Section 4.
Data and Methodology

Data
We examine a panel of 28 African countries with data from the World Development Indicators (WDI), Chinn & Ito (2002) and Gwartney et al. (2011) for the period 1996-2010.
The latter and the latest sources provide measurements of "de jure capital openness" (KAOPEN) and economic freedom respectively. Limitations to the number of countries and periodicity of analysis are twofold: the motivation of capturing the effects of second generation reforms and constraints in data availability on inequality, poverty and the quality of institutions. The dependent variables include: the GINI index and the poverty headcount ratio (less than $2 per day) for the appreciation of income-inequality and poverty respectively. Data on poverty is so scarce; nonetheless since scholarly focus on African poverty is rare owing to lack of relevant data, we have employed the few degrees of freedom we could fetch from the WDI.
In the study, we distinguish among four types of liberalization policies that come with (Edwards, 1999) and; (3) more recently, China's de facto openness, despite its de jure closeness has been subject to discussion in research circles (Prasad & Wei, 2007; Aizenman & Glick, 2009; Shah & Patnaik, 2009 ). Secondly, trade liberalization is measured by trade openness and exports. While the former is the sum of imports and exports of commodities as a % of GDP, the latter only consists of commodity exports as a % of GDP.
Thirdly, political liberalization is appreciated by the Polity IV index and democracy. Fourthly, the other liberalization measure is economic freedom which broadly represents: freedom to trade internationally; legal structure and security of property rights; access to sound money; size of government (expenditures, taxes and enterprises) and; regulation of credit, labor and business.
Government quality instrumental variables include: corruption, government effectiveness, political stability (no violence), rule of law, regulation quality, corruptioncontrol and voice & accountability. Owing to constraints in degrees of freedom indispensible for the overidentifying restrictions (OIR) Sargan test 2 , we can only employ one control variable. We control for the wealth of nations with economic prosperity (GDP growth).
Accordingly, we expect economic prosperity to mitigate poverty and inequality if its fruits are evenly distributed owing to the instrumentality of formal institutions.
Details about variable definitions and corresponding data sources, summary statistics 
Methodology
We are concerned with endogeneity for four main reasons: (1) the government quality instrumental variables are perception based measures that are subject to a high degree of media propaganda; (2) we might have omitted some variables of government quality not incorporated in the WDI; (3) while globalization affects poverty, it cannot be ruled-out that the state of poverty (and inequality) in countries shape liberalization polices, hence an issue of reverse causality and; (4) the problem statement by definition presupposes the existence of endogeneity by its contingency on the use of instrumental variables. To tackle the endogeneity concern, we shall first assess its presence with the Hausman test before employing an estimation technique that is relevant to the outcome of the test.
We adopt a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS) Instrumental Variable (IV) estimation technique for two reasons: on the one hand, it addresses the puzzle of endogeneity and; on the other hand, it is compatible with the problem statement of the study which aims to assess the instrumentality of formal institutions in the effect of freedom channels on poverty (and inequality). Accordingly, IV estimation addresses the puzzle of endogeneity and hence avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error term in the main equation.
We adopt the following steps in the IV analysis: (1) justify the choice of a 2SLS over an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; (2) verify the instruments are exogenous to the endogenous components of the explaining variables (globalization freedom channels) and; (3) ensure the instruments are valid and not correlated with the error-term in the main equation with an Over-identifying Restrictions (OIR) test.
Further robustness checks will be ensured with; (1) robust Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent (HAC) standard errors and; (2) the use of three-year nonoverlapping intervals (NOI) to mitigate short-run disturbances that may loom substantially large.
Empirical analysis
Presentation of results
This section aims to tackle the two main issues highlighted in the motivation of the paper, notably: (1) whether institutions are instrumental in the effect of globalization on the human face and; (2) assessing the freedom channels of globalization that matter for the instrumentality of formal institutions in poverty and inequality reduction. While the first issue is addressed by the Sargan OIR test, tackling the second depends on both the results of the Sargan OIR test and the significance of estimated coefficients. The null hypothesis of the Sargan test is the position that the instruments explain inequality (poverty) only through the globalization freedom mechanisms, conditional on economic prosperity (control variable).
Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis is a rejection of the view that the government quality instruments do not explain inequality (poverty) beyond the globalization channels. A
Hausman test is performed prior to every 2SLS-IV approach. The null hypothesis of this test is the stance that estimated coefficients by OLS are efficient and consistent. Hence, a rejection of this null hypothesis points to the concern of endogeneity due to inconsistent estimates and hence, lends credit to the choice of the IV estimation technique. Accordingly, but for a few exceptions in the poverty models (of Table2), there is an overwhelming rejection of the null hypothesis of the Hausman, hence, lending credit to the appropriateness of the choice of an IV estimation technique.
As concerns the first issue, the failure to reject the null hypothesis of the Sargan test in most of the models is an indication that, formal institutions are instrumental in the effect globalization freedom channels have on the human face. Concerning the second issue, the following could be established: (1) de jure capital account openness and trade openness mitigate inequality while economic freedom (polity IV) increases it (Table 1) ; (2) economic freedom decreases poverty while polity IV increases it (Table 2) and; (3) the control variable of economic prosperity is significant with the right sign, meaning with the right institutions in place, economic prosperity mitigates inequality because the fruits of the prosperity are evenly distributed. 
Discussion of results
Before diving into the discussion of results, it is important to highlight two main practical difficulties. Firstly comparing the results of inequality (Table 1) with those of poverty (Table 2 ) may appear not so common place because of the substantial difference in degrees of freedom. The absence of a substantial change in the number of observations as one moves from "full data" to three-year NOI in Table 2 confirms the issue of shortage in degrees of freedom in the poverty data we have earlier discussed in the data section. Hence, we are aware of the risk of comparing results from the two tables and further argue that, applied econometrics has other tasks than the mere conformity to important (and comparable) degrees of freedom before empirical analysis. Our argument further holds grounds on two counts.
Firstly, there are no other sources of data on poverty beside that from the WDI and, scholarly focus has avoided employing the poverty headcount ratio because of the issues already covered above. Secondly, the effect of economic freedom on poverty and inequality is antagonistic which may raise further doubts as to whether the two tables are indeed comparable owing to the limited degrees of freedom in the second. Nonetheless, we shall carry on with the discussion contingent on the caveat that, the interpretations should be treated with caution in light of the points discussed above.
The inequality mitigating effect of de jure capital account openness and trade openness point the fact that, formal institutions have the capacity to device policies that will
give capital and trade account liberalizations a human face. Three points are worth discussing. between trade policies and income inequality through the channel of land abundance (Fischer, 2000) and through political economy factors (Easterly, 2002) ; intra-household inequality through changes in employment opportunities between male and female household members (Winters, 2000) , as well as through changes in the composition of the whole workforce (UNDP, 2003) and; overall inequality tends to rise in Africa even if more women are employed with the expansion of textile industries in the wake of trade liberalization (Blackden, 2003) .
Thirdly, the positive impact of political liberalization (democratization) on inequality is not unexpected in Africa. The advent of democratization does not really bring alongside good politicians that equitably share the fruits of economic prosperity. The case of many developing countries in Southeast Asia (Scott, 1972) , India (Wade, 1985) and Turkey (Sayari, 1977) ; post communist countries like Russia (Varese, 1997) and many Latin American countries upon the waves of democratization (Weyland, 1998) confirm this fact. It is in this vein that Asongu (2011b) advises that democracy once initiated in Africa should be accelerated to edge the appeals of authoritarian regimes and reap the benefits of time and level hypotheses.
Contrary to the negative effect of financial liberalization on inequality, the insignificance of the globalization freedom channels on poverty is consistent with recent literature. Arestis & Caner (2010) have found no statistically significant relationship between the degree of capital account liberalization and poverty rate. The positive effect of political liberalization is consistent with the explanation provided above.
The antagonistic effects of economic freedom on inequality and poverty could be explained from the Pareto vs Gini debate. Accordingly, economic freedom has a substantial legal structure component which means that formal institutions are instrumental in economic freedom in comparison to other globalization channels. Hence, it could be established that formal institutions are instrumental in mitigating poverty but not inequality through the economic freedom channel. The explanation presupposes that, inequality according to Pareto is not bad provided the increase in wealth by some in the upper-income brackets is not at the expense of the worst-off (lower-income brackets). In this context, the Gini coefficient can be defined as an increase in the incomes of the rich with no change in the incomes of others.
Hence, an increase in the Gini coefficient respects the Pareto rule. Hence, it could be said that economic freedom does not stop the wealthy from growing wealthier, but at the same time provides for conditions that mitigate poverty.
Conclusion
Are 
